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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
PHYLLIS LANG,
Plaintiff'-Appellant,
vs.
J. ROBERT LANG,
Defendant,

Case
No.
10225

SAMUEL J. CARTER,
Intervenor-Respondent.

BRIEF OF INTERVENOR-RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
On February 28, 1964, in the District Court of Salt
Lake County, State of Utah, a garnishee judgment in
favor of plaintiff, Phyllis Lang, in the sum of $9,375.00
was signed, filed and entered against the garnishee-respondent (mistakenly designated intervenor-respondent)
Samuel J. 'Carter, Executor of the Estate of John Lang,
deceased.
DISPOSITION OF THE LOWER COURT
Upon motion of the garnishee-respondent (intervenor-respondent), Samuel J. Carter, Executor of the Estate
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of John Lang, deceased, the Hon. Bay Van Cott, Jr., a
judge of said District Court, on July 31, 1964, signed,
entered and filed an Order setting aside, annulling and
declaring void the aforesaid garnishee judgment.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent Carter, as Executor of the Estate of
John Lang, deceased, seeks affirmance of the Order
of the lower court setting aside, annulling, and declaring
void the aforesaid garnishee judgment against respondent, signed, entered and filed on July 31, 1964.

S T A T E M E N T OF F A C T S
I.

As to Record on Appeal.

Respondent Carter, as Executor of the Estate of
John Lang, deceased, has filed in this Court and Cause
his motion to strike from the record on appeal five
certain documents designated as follows: (a) the Affidavit of D. M. Arnoss, attorney for appellant, dated
August 24, 1964; (b) the Motion of Tracy Collins Bank
and Trust Company, Trustee-Intervenor, to set aside
garnishee judgment against said Carter as Executor
of the Estate of John Lang, deceased, dated February
28, 1964; (c) the Motion of said Tracy Collins Bank and
Trust Company as Trustee to intervene in the action of
Phyllis Lang vs. J. Robert Lang; (d) Order making
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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Tracy Collins Bank and Trust Company as Trustee a
party to the above entitled action; and (e) all documents
filed in a certain action commenced and pending in said
Third District Court designated as Civil Action No.
148659, entitled Samuel J. Carter, etc. vs. Phyllis Lang,
etc. The bases for said motion are that each and all of
the said documents are immaterial and irrelavent to the
issues on appeal in this case; that the Amoss affidavit
was filed subsequent to the order appealed from and is
self-serving, and the facts therein alleged are irrelevant
and immaterial to the issues involved on this appeal; and
as to (e) supra, the said action No. 148659 and the matters
involved therein are entirely irrelevant and immaterial
to the issues involved on this appeal, and that said documents were not introduced in evidence at the hearing of
the motion to set aside the garnishee judgment against
respondent.
(a)

Amoss

Affidavit.

The order appealed from (R-15) was signed by
Judge Van Cott on July 31, 1964. No motion to modify
or amend said order was made. The Amoss Affidavit is
dated August 24, 1964, and was filed in the office of the
Clerk of the District Court on August 25, 1964. In paragraph 4 thereof (E-13), the affidavit attempts to set forth
the proceedings on the argument of a motion to dismiss
interposed by Wilford Burton, a defendant in Civil
Action No. 148659 entitled Samuel J. Carter, etc. vs.
Phyllis Lang, etc., and also to report the decision of the
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Court on said motion. Amoss was and is attorney for
the plaintiff-appellant,
(b) Motion of Tracy Collins Bank and Trust Company to set aside garnishee judgment against Samuel J.
Carter as Executor of the Estate of John Lang, deceased.
This motion (R-9) was made in the instant action
after Tracy Collins Bank and Trust Company as Trustee
had been made a party defendant thereto (R-8). The
motion to set aside said garnishee judgment against
'Carter as Executor (R-9) was based on the fact that the
judgments in favor of plaintiff, Phyllis Lang, against
the defendant, J. Robert Lang, upon which the writ of
garnishment against said Carter as Executor was issued
are null and void on the ground that no proper service
of process was made upon said J. Robert Lang as a
basis for obtaining any of said judgments.
(c) Motion of Tracy Collins Bank and Trust Company as Trustee to intervene in the action of Phyllis
Lang vs. J. Robert Lang (R-9).
The basis for this motion was that said Tracy
Collins Bank and Trust Company as Trustee was not
adequately represented for the protection of its interests
and that it might be bound by a judgment in said action
(R-9).
(d) Order making Tracy Collins Bank and
Company as Trustee a party to the action (R-8).

Trust
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'Tins order dated Jul)" 2, 1.964, made Trac> 'Collins
Bank and Trust Company, Trustee, a party to the action.
(R. 8)
(e) Documents in the case entitled Samuel J. Carter, etc. vs. Phyllis Lang, etc.
! - is i s Civil A n . . . i • • IM>;,:) 1'ilc; ,r ih.- idistrict
r-)i;-i (»r S.M!- Lake C o u n t } , 1 Uih, -MI v . i . v h ">, 1964, b y
Niiiiii' : .!. < ;n i c r a s an individual and also in his capacity
as Executor of the Estate and under l ! . last will and
testament of John Lang, deceased, against Phyllis Lang,
J. Robert Lang, Wilford M. Burton and George Beckstead, Sheriff of Salt Lake County, Utah. The file in this
action was designated by appellant as part of the record
</;. appall (R-18), iw*\
\---x< ueen transmitted to the
Supreme i ^uv-. Th- ;rih>i! i> ;l r interpleader action
instituted by < plaintiff therein against the defendants
therein praying for a judgment <•!' *\u *'• •;,-•' requiring
them to interplead. It alleges that said Carter in his
capacity as Executor aforesaid holds the sum of $9,375.00
to which he makes no claim of interest, but that the defendants have made conflicting demands upon him for
payment, and that he is unable to determine the rightful
owner thereof, and is willing t«> pay the same to such
persons as should be lawfully entitled thereto ''
'T< s
to bring said sum of money into court at such time and
under such conditions as the court may order and direct.
The garnishee-appellant filed in the District Court on
September 15, 1964, his designation of additional record
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on appeal and objection to the designation by appellant
of the items particularly described in (a), (b), (c), (d)
and (e) above (R-21, 22) as being included in the record
on appeal.
2.

As to the Merits of the Case.

(a) The garnishee-respondent, Samuel J. Carter, was appointed Executor of the Estate and under
the last will and testament of John Lang, deceased,
by an order made, entered and filed in those certain
proceedings instituted and now pending in the
Superior Court of the State of California in and
for the County of Orange, entitled u I n the Matter
of the Estate of John Lang, Deceased." The said
garnishee-respondent qualified as such Executor
and has since his appointment been the regularly
appointed, qualified and acting Executor of said
estate; said garnishee-respondent has not been appointed ancillary executor of the Estate of John
Lang, deceased, by any court of the State of Utah
•(R-10, 11, and 13).
(b) The plaintiff, Phyllis Lang, asserts and
represents that she recovered judgments against the
defendant, J. Robert Lang, in this action as follows:
On April 19, 1962, in the amount of $2,800.00 with
interest and attorney's fees; on March 19, 1963, in
the amount of $8,350.00 with interest and attorney's
fees, and on February 26, 1961, in the amount of
$3,850.00 with interest and attorney's fees (R-9).
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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I t was these judgments that Tracy Collins Bank
and Trust Company as Trustee attacked by motion
to set aside the garnishee judgment against the garnishee-respondent. There is nothing in the record on
appeal that indicates the disposition of this motion.
(c) Based on the alleged judgments above described, the plaintiff on February 27, 1964, caused
a writ of garnishment to issue against Samuel J.
Carter, Executor, and a copy of the same was served
upon the said Carter on February 28, 1964. The
said Carter, as Executor, responded to the interrogatories contained in said Avrit of garnishment as
follows:
"FIRST.—Are you in any manner indebted
to the defendants, or either of them, either in
property, or money, and is the same now due?
If not due, when is the same to become due?
State fully all particulars.
"Answer: Yes — As Executor of the Estate
of John Lang, deceased, in the Superior Court
of the State of California, in and for the County
of Orange.
"SECOND.—Have you in your possession, in
your charge, or under your control, any property,
effects, goods, chattels, rights, credits, or choses
in action of said defendants or either of them, or
in which he is interested? If so, state what is the
value of the same, and state fully all particulars.
"Answer: Yes—As such Executor, I have in
my possession $9,375 owing to defendant in settle-
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ment of an action brought against me as such
Executor by defendant and others.
"THIRD.—Do you know of any debts owing
to the said defendants, whether due or not due,
or any property, effects, goods, chattels, rights,
credits, or choses in action, belonging to him, or
in which he is interested, and now in the possession or under the control of others? If so, state
the particulars.
"Answer: No."
(d) On February 28, 1964, upon motion of the
plaintiff, the Court made, entered and filed a garnishee judgment against Samuel J. Carter as the Executor of the Estate of John Lang, deceased, for the
sum of $9,375,00 (R-14). On the same date the plaintiff caused a garnishee execution to issue against
said Samuel J. Carter as Executor of the Estate
of John Lang, deceased, (R-5) and it was served
on the same date (R-6) and returned unsatisfied.
(e) Samuel J. Carter as Executor of the Estate
of John Lang, deceased, thereupon moved the Court
for an order setting aside and nullifying the aforesaid garnishee judgment (R-10,11 and 12). This motion was filed in the office of the Clerk of the District Court on July 22, 1964 (R-12). On July 31,
1964 (R-15) Judge Van Cott signed and filed the
order setting aside said garnishee judgment (R~15),
and it is from this order that the plaintiff appeals.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE MOTION OF GARNISHEE-RESPONDENT
CARTER, EXECUTOR OF THE ESTATE OF
JOHN LANG, DECEASED, FILED IN THIS
COURT AND CAUSE TO STRIKE FROM THE
RECORD ON APPEAL CERTAIN DOCUMENTS
AND PAPERS SHOULD BE GRANTED.
Each document which is the subject of this motion
will be discussed separately.
I. Amoss

Affidavit.

(a) This affidavit was filed in the office of the
Clerk of the District Court on August 25, 1964. The
order setting aside and nullifying the garnishee
judgment from which this appeal is taken is dated
July 31, 1964, and on that date was undoubtedly
filed in the office of the Clerk of the Court. This
affidavit was filed subsequent to the order appealed
from and therefore it cannot be considered part of
the record on appeal.
Broads v. Mead, 159 Cal. 765, 116 Pac. 460;
Southern Insurance Co. v. Anderson, 130 Tenn.
482, 172S.W. 318;
Thomson v. Wooster, 114 U.S. 104, 29 L.ed. 105,
5 S.Ct. 788;
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Hopt v. Utah, 114 U.S. 488, 29 L.ed. 183, 5 S.Ct.
972;
Howard v. Howard, 269 Wis. 334, 69 N.W.(2d)
492;
Berg v. Griffith, 127 Neb. 501, 256 N.W. 44, 102
A.L.R, 1124;
Smolinski v. Kabla, 21 Ohio App. 52, 153 N.E.
104.
(b) The affidavit itself contains self-serving
statements of the attorney for the plaintiff-appellant.
It is an attempt on his part to rectify a defect in the
record on appeal. The Court file in the action of
Samuel J. Carter, etc. vs. Phyllis Lang, etc. (Civil
Action 148,659) Avas not introduced in evidence at
the time of the argument of the motion to annul
and set aside the garnishee judgment. The recital
of paragraph 4 of this affidavit attempts to correct
this deficiency.
(c) P a r a g r a p h 4 of the affidavit contains
declarations which are manifestly the rankest type
of hearsay. The affiant attempts to recite the occurrences at the argument of counsel upon the presentation of a motion in a separate and distinct
action. It sets forth facts upon which no issue was
joined at the hearing on the motion to set aside the
garnishee judgment. The garnishee-respondent Carter, Exectftor, had no opporunity to meet and
controvert the allegations of this paragraph.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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(d) The issue in this instant appeal to be
determined is whether or not the garnishee judgment
against the garnishee-respondent is valid. The facts
set forth in paragraph 4 of the affidavit are entirely immaterial and irrelevant to this issue. There
can be no problem as to res judicata because the
order of Judge Anderson denying the motion of
Burton to dismiss the interpleader complaint was
not a final judgment upon which such plea could
be based,
"***since it is a general rule that a judgment
sought to be used as a basis for the application
of the doctrine of res judicata must be final and
not an interlocutory judgment." (30A Am. J u r .
— Judgments — Sec. 340, p. 384).
Preliminary orders such as sustaining or denying
motions to dismiss are not final judgments which
can be pleaded as res judicata or estoppel by judgment in another action. Loveless v. Carten, 64 Ga.
App. 54, 12 S.E.(2d) 715. And an order denying a
motion to dismiss not being final is not res judicata.
Sachs v. Ohio Nat. Life Ins. Co., 148 F e d (2d) 128,
158 L.R.A. 688, 693; cert, denied, 326 U.S. 753, 90
L.ed. 452, 66 S.Ct. 92.
"All judicial and academic authority supports
the rule that the issues which are litigated or may
be litigated in an action can be finally adjudicated
only by final judgment on the merits Discontinuance or abatement of the action before final
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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judgment leaves the issues open to content in
other litigation, even though they had been decided provisionally by order entered upon a motion made in the action or by interlocutory judgment,
"The test then is not the form of the decision,
but the nature of the proceedings in which the
adjudication is made. If in such proceedings the
jurisdiction of the court is limited in scope so
that particular questions may be decided only
provisionally or for a limited purpose, a decision
in any form can be given effect only within the
same limits. Thus, a motion to open a default for
any reason is generally addressed to the discretion of the court, and is in its nature interlocutory.
Such a motion can never result in a decision of
the issues involved in the controversy, since it is
always predicated upon the fact that the defaulting party has lost the opportunity to present the
issue to the court, and the question always is
whether the party applying should be permitted
to plead." * * * On the other hand, an order
entered upon the report of a referee on a motion
to cancel a judgment is conclusive adjudication
'so far as it covers what was actually and necessarily tried on that reference.' * * * In both cases
the proceedings were in form motions in an action, and in both cases the court was required to
decide all questions of law or fact presented. The
distinction is that in the first case the only relief
which was asked, or which the court could grant,
upon the motion was provisional in its nature,
and even if granted, would leave open for subsequent conclusive adjudication in the same action
every issue of fact raised by the pleadings, while
in the second case, if the application were granted,
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

13
the questions necessarily decided upon the application could not be litigated anew in any litigation
pending in the same tribunal. Thus the nature
of the first proceeding precluded a final decision
of the questions there raised, while the nature of
the second proceeding required such decision."
(Bannon v. Bannon, 270 N.Y. 484, 1 N.E. (2d)
975, 105 A.L.R, 1401 at 1405).
The order denying Burton's motion to dismiss Carter's interpleader complaint did not finally determine the
issues of that lawsuit. It was but preliminary to a final
judgment which would be entered after trial on the
merits. An order denying a motion to dismiss is but
a preliminary order not finally adjudicating the issues.
(Rule 12(b) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure). A motion
to dismiss does not call for adjudication on the merits
of the case but is concerned solely with the question of
whether the pleadings sustain the cause of action.
(Daehla Greeting Cards, Inc. v. Summerfield, D.C.D.C.
1953,116 Fed. Sup. 68; SavadaBros. v. Conville, D.C.Pa.
1948, 8 F.R.D. 127).
This affidavit should be stricken from the record on
appeal.
2. Motion of Tracy Collins Bank and Trust Company, Trustee, to intervene in the instant action; order
making Tracy Collins Bank and Trust Company, Trustee,
a party to said action and its motion to set aside the
garnishee judgment against garnishee-respondent.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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These documents and the action represented thereby
are certainly immateral and irrelevant to the issue on
this appeal. While the record on appeal shows that
Tracy Collins Bank and Trust Company, Trustee, was
made a party to this action, it does not show the disposition by the Court of its motion to set aside the garnishee judgment. These documents should not have
been placed in the record on appeal. They give no assistance in determining the validity of the garnishee
judgment as between plaintiff-appellant and the garnishee-respondent. They should be stricken.
3. District Court file in action of Samuel J. Carter, etc. vs. Phyllis Lang, etc., Civil Action 148659.
(a) This file covers an interpleader action
filed by Samuel J, Carter as Executor of the Estate
of John Lang, deceased, and as an individual against
Phyllis Lang, J. Robert Lang, Wilford M. Burton,
and George Beckstead, Sheriff of Salt Lake County,
Utah. The file was never introduced in evidence at
the hearing of the motion of the garnishee-respondent to set aside, annul and declare void the garnishee
judgment against said Carter in his representative
capacity aforesaid. It therefore could not be considered by the trial court in the determination of
this motion. The affidavit of Amoss, discussed in
(a) supra, was an attempt by counsel for the plaintiff-appellant to dragoon this file into the record
on appeal.
;::
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"Documentary evidence consisting of copies
of court records in other proceedings are not
properly a part of the record and cannot be considered on appeal, where the evidence is not reported, the trial judge made no report of material
facts found by him, and there is nothing to show
that such copies were all the evidence presented
at the hearing below." (Syllabus). (Damon v.
Damon, 312 Mass. 268, 44 N.E.(2d) 657,143 A.L.R.
463).
"The record contains no copy of the answer
of the defendant Laura Powers in the partition
suit and no statement of its substance. We cannot
consider a copy of Laura Powers' answer attached
as an exhibit to the application for the writ and
made from an abstract of title used on the trial.
References in the statement of facts to pages of
the abstract on which other instruments which
were copied in the statement of facts appear do
not make the answer of Laura Powers a part of
the record when it is nowhere copied or referred
to in the statement of facts." (Davis v. First
Nat. Bank, 139 Tex. 36, 161 S.W.(2d) 467, 144
A.L.R, 1).
(b) The institution and pendency of said Civil
Action No. 148,659 and the issues therein involved
are matters entirely irrelevant to the issues raised
by the aforesaid motion of Carter as Executor, etc,
to annul the garnishee judgment.
The District Court file in this action should be
stricken from the record on appeal.
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POINT II
PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT HAS PROCEEDED IN
THIS ACTION AGAINST CARTER IN HIS CAPACITY AS EXECUTOR OF THE ESTATE AND
UNDER THE LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT
OF JOHN LANG, D E C E A S E D , AND NOT
AGAINST CARTER AS AN INDIVIDUAL.
The copy of the writ of garnishment served on
Carter (R-l) was addressed to him in his capacity as
Executor. He answered the same in his capacity as "Executor of the Estate of John Lang, deceased" ( R - l ) ,
and by his answers he specifically declared that his possession of the sum of $9,375.00 was in his role as Executor and not as an individual. The garnishee judgment
(R-4) was against "Samuel J. Carter as Executor of the
Estate of John Lang, deceased"; it was not against
Carter as an individual. The garnishee execution (R-5)
based on said garnishee judgment was against Carter
as Executor. The notice of appeal in this action (R-17)
designated the order appealed from as "setting aside,
annulling and declaring void that certain garnishee
judgment rendered in this action on the 28th day of
February, 1964, against Samuel J . Carter, Executor of
the Estate of John Lang and in favor of plaintiff above
named" (R-17) (Italics supplied).
In its manifest, therefore, on the face of the record
that Carter was before the District Court as Executor
of the Lang Estate and not as an individual. He is
before this Court in his role as Executor and not as an
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individual. The plaintiff-appellant, by her own action,
chose to bring Carter before the Court in his representative capacity and not as an individual.
The foregoing facts proved by the record on appeal
decisively deny the assertion by plaintiff-appellant found
at the top of page 12 of her brief to the effect that "the
proceeding is not against Mr. Carter in his representative capacity as executor of the estate of John Lang,
but rather in his capacity as a personal debtor to the
defendant. In the subject case no attempt is being made
to substitute Mr. Carter as a party for the deceased."
POINT III
A PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF A DECEASED PERSON CAN SUE OR BE SUED, OR
CAN BE A PARTY TO AN ACTION OR PROCEEDING IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS
REPRESENTATIVE, ONLY IN THE STATE
WHERE HE WAS APPOINTED, AND HIS ROLE
AS EXTENDED PERSONALITY OF THE DEEASED DOES NOT EXIST EXTRATERRITORIALLY BUT ONLY WITHIN THE FOUR CORNERS OF THE STATE OF HIS APPOINTMENT,
EXCEPT WHERE, BY SPECIAL APPEARANCE
OR EXTRAORDINARY WRIT THE COURT'S
JURISDICTION TO ENTERTAIN THE LITIGATION ITSELF IS ATTACKED.
I. This case is governed by the general rule. The
above principle of law is firmly established in Utah.
(Wilcox v. District Court of Salt Lake 'County, et al.,

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

18
2 Utah (2d) 227, 272 Pac. (2d) 157). It is also the law
of the State of California (Kaplan v. Superior Court,
191 Cal. App.(2d) 482, 12 Cal. Rep. 781, 782; Winbigler
v. Shattuck, 40 Cal. App. 562,195 Pac. 707). The doctrine
is generally applied (MacMaster v. Gould, 239 N.Y. 606,
147 N.E. 214, 40 A.L.R. 792; Nat. Bank of Topeka, et al.
v. Mitchell, et al., 154 Kan. 276, 118 Pac. (2d) 519; 4
Bancroft's Probate Practice (2d), Sec. 1225 p. 573; Lefebure, et al. v. Baker, et a l , 60 Mont. 193, 220 Pac. 1111).
"If we go back to the historic origin of the
executor's position, we find that he once took the
assets in his own right. Executors in Earlier English Law by Holmes, 9 Harvard L. Rev. 42. No
reason could then be given why he should not
be sued wherever he could be found. But at the
present day both executors and administrators
hold the assets of the estate in a fiduciary capacity. The will is the source of the executor's
power, and letters testamentary are evidence of
his authority, but the rights and liabilities of both
executors and administrators in respect to the
fund in their hands are like those of trustees.
The wide distinction between the nature of the
title of executors and administrators has disappeared, but this essential difference as to the
source of title remains: The foreign administrator exists only by virtue of the statute of another
state; the executor's authority springs from the
will and not from the letters testamentary." (MacMaster v. Gould, supra).
The plaintiff-appellant proceeded against Carter, as
above demonstrated in Point II, in his capacity as a
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foreign executor by the issuance of the writ of garnishment against him in such capacity. Carter answered
the writ as Executor of the Lang Estate. The garnishee
judgment was against Carter as Executor of the Lang
Estate, and the execution garnishment ran against him
in the same capacity. Carter as a California executor
did not and does not exist in Utah. The plaintiff-appellant, therefore proceeded against less than a shadow — a
non-axistent personality and entity. The garnishee judgment she obtained has no legal efficacy; it is a blank
piece of paper. Under the rule announced, Carter as
California executor was authorized to appear specially
on his motion to set aside this imaginative, fictitious
judgment of no legal effect. The District Court had
no alternative but to cancel and annul this fictitious
judgment,
2. This case is not within any exception to the
general rule. Plaintiff-appellant, under Point I I of her
brief, asserts that the garnishee judgment in this action
may be sustained under an exception to the general rule.
The complete answer to this contention is that there is
not an iota of evidence in the record on appeal that there
were or are any funds of the estate within the jurisdiction
of the District Court of Salt Lake County which must
be disposed of or preserved. There is a presumption, in
the absence of negative proof, that inasmuch as Carter
was and is a California executor the funds are within
the State of California and under the jurisdiction of the
Superior Court of Orange County. No effort has been
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made by plaintiff-appellant to prove that the funds were
or are within the State of Utah. The record is completely
silent on that point. Secondly, Carter as Executor of
the Lang Estate has been guilty of no act which could
stamp him as "an individual wrong-doer." He promptly
responded to the interrogatories of the Avrit of garnishment. He honestly stated that he held funds as Executor of the Lang Estate "owing to defendant (J. Eobert
Lang) in settlement of an action brought against me as
such Executor by defendant and others." In his response
he made no claim to these funds as an individual. Thirdly,
there is no failure of justice in the action of Judge Van
Cott in annulling the fictitious garnishee judgment
against the California executor. If the exception exists
it can be justified only in those instances where a creditor
is denied other relief or the enforcement of his rights
is an onerous and almost impossible accomplishment.
Such is not the fact in the instant case. The California
courts were open to her at all times to enforce her claim
against the funds in the possession of the California executor.
This case might well end at this point.
POINT IV

THE FUNDS HELD BY CARTER AS CALIFORNIA EXECUTOR DO NOT REPRESENT A DISTRIBUTIVE SHARE OF THE LANG ESTATE.
Carter in his answer to the second interrogatory
contained in the writ of garnishment answered: "Yes —

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

21
as such executor I have in my possession $9,375.00 owing
to defendant in settlement of an action brought against
me as such executor by defendant and others." (Italics
supplied.) There is no denial of Carter's statement in the
record on appeal. It stands uncontroverted and undenied.
These funds do not represent the defendant's distributive
share in the Lang Estate inasmuch as there has been no
segregation of the estate's assets for purposes of distribution to the heirs or beneficiaries of the estate. They
were funds which remained part of the estate's assets but
which the executor intended to use in payment of the settlement of the defendant's claim against him. There cannot be found in the record on appeal any evidence other
than the assertion made by Carter in his return to the
writ of garnishment identifying these funds. It therefore
follows that the argument and authorities presented in
Point I of plaintiff-appellant's brief do not relate to or
cover the situation in the present case.
POINT V
THE UTAH DISTRICT COURT HAD NO JURISDICTION OVER THE FUNDS HELD BY THE
CALIFORNIA EXECUTOR AND AS PART OF
THE ASSETS OF A CALIFORNIA ESTATE AND
THEREFORE COULD NOT RENDER A BINDING OR EFFECTIVE JUDGMENT DISPOSING
OF THE SAME.
The record on appeal shows conclusively that Carter
held these funds in his role as California executor, lie
made a voluntary appearance in the garnishment pro-
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ceedings by filing his return to the writ of garnishment.
He conferred jurisdiction of the Court over himself personally, but he could not and did not confer jurisdiction
of the Court over the res. The res in this instance were
the funds in his possession as executor appointed by a
California court. It was beyond his authority to confer
upon the District Court any jurisdiction over these funds.
In the case of Bristol v. Brent, 36 Utah, 108, 103 P a c
1076 at 1079, the Court wrote:
"The regularity of this service, in so far as it
is personal to the garnishee, may be waived by
him, and he may appear before the court, either
in person or by answer, if the law authorizes one
to be made and filed, and thereby confer jurisdiction over his person. But when the garnishee has
thus conferred jurisdiction upon the court over
his person, only one of the essential elements to
its complete jurisdiction to proceed in the case
is present. The other, jurisdiction over the res,
is still lacking. While the defendant, no doubt,
may insist that, unless the court have jurisdiction
over the person of the garnishee, the debt owing
from the garnishee to the defendant cannot be
seized, yet the defendant cannot prevent the garnishee from waiving any defects in the service in
so far as it affects merely the jurisdiction of the
court over the person of the garnishee. But
when it affects the res, the very thing to be taken
from the defendant, he may insist upon a full
compliance with the law, and without such compliance the court can acquire no jurisdiction over
it without the consent of the defendant. Whether
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the court has jurisdiction over the res or not,
therefore, does not depend on whether the garnishee objects, but it depends entirely on whether
the statute, by virtue of which alone the court is
authorized to act, has been complied with. If the
return of the officer discloses an essential defect
in this regard, the court is without power to proceed, and hence should arrest the proceedings on
its own motion."
This rule has been followed in a great number of
cases.
"The court had no jurisdiction of the res in
this case, and therefore was in no position to
render a binding or effective judgment in so far
as the property or credits of the principal defendant were concerned." (Federal Truck Co. v.
Mayer, 216 Mo. App. 443, 270 S.W. 407).
"As the justice was without jurisdiction of
the res (the real subject matter) for two reasons:
first, that the service of jjrocess was invalid and
not cured by appearance although appearance was
made; and, second, because the subject matter
itself is not in the state nor subject to the process
of its courts * * *. The answer of the garnishee,
setting up its non-residence, was not controverted,
so far as the record shows, and must be taken as
true. That establishes a want of jurisdiction by
showing that the subject matter is beyond the
territorial jurisdiction of the court. It is an
utter want of jurisdiction, in defiance of which
the justice went on and gave judgment. * * *
What purports to be the return of service being
void under the statute and decisions of this court,
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it could not confer any jurisdiction of the subject
matter, although the garnishee appeared and subjected itself to the jurisdiction of the court."
(Pennsylvania Railroad Co. v. Rogers, et al., 52
W. Va.* 450, 62 L.R.A. 178, 189).
"Obviously, the trial court was without power
to render a judgment against the garnishee in the
first instance because the court was without jurisdiction of the res. A judgment rendered without
jurisdiction is, of course, void." (Upjohn Co. v.
Board of Commissioners, 25 N.M. 526, 185 Pac.
279).
The funds held by Carter as Executor until actually
paid by him to the person entitled thereto remained part
of the assets of the California estate and were under
the jurisdiction and protection of the Orange County
Superior Court. While Carter acknowledged in his garnishment answer that he was indebted as executor to
J. Robert Lang, this acknowledgment was simply his
statement of an indebtedness due from the California
executor to Lang. Unless and until Carter as executor
paid these funds to Lang they remained part of the
California estate. There had been no segregation of the
same from the general assets of the estate. These funds
did not arise from a distribution of the California estate
to the devisees or legatees of John Lang, deceased. Nothing in the record on appeal denies that these funds,
together with all other assets of the estate, were within
the State of California and not within the jurisdiction
of the Utah courts. The consequence is that no judgment
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of a Utah court could affect this res which was beyond
its jurisdiction.
The verity and legal soundness of the conclusion
above set forth that the Utah District Court could not acquire jurisdiction over the res is confirmed by posing the
simple question: Could J. Robert Lang have sued Carter
as California executor of the Estate of John Lang, deceased, in the District Court of Salt Lake County? The
answer is an emphatic and unqualified "No." This conclusion is supported by the statement of Mr. Justice
Peckham in the case of Harris v. Balk, 198 U.S., 226,
49 L.ed. 1028, 25 S.Ct. 625:
"If there be a law of the state providing for
the attachment of the debt, then if the garnishee
be found in that state, and process be personally
served upon him therein, we think the court thereby acquires jurisdiction over him, and can garnish
the debt due from him to the debtor of the plaintiff and condemn it, provided the garnishee himself could be sued by his creditor in that state."
(Italics supplied).
The principle enunciated by the Supreme Court of
the United States, supra, was adopted by the Supreme
Court of Utah in Bristol v. Brent, 38 Utah, 58, 110 Pac.
356 at page 362:
"The United States Supreme Court, to our
minds, makes it quite clear that a debt can only be
condemned in the hands of a garnishee in a jurisdiction where the creditor of such garnishee could
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himself enforce payment of sack debt against the
garnishee. This is logical, for the reason that
if nothing tangible is attached by the process of
garnishment, and nothing is arrested except the
obligation to pay the debt by the garnishee, it
must follow that a court may not disregard the
conditions upon which the obligation to pay rests,
and may not enforce it against the garnishee unless the garnishee's creditor could enforce it at
the time when, and at the place where, the action
is commenced against the creditor of the garnishee.7' (Italics supplied).
I t is clear beyond all doubt that J. Eobert Lang could
not have sued Carter as California executor of the Estate
of John Lang, deceased, in the District Court of Salt
Lake County, Utah. (See Point I I I supra). Beyond
peradventure it then follows that a creditor of J. Robert
Lang could not garnish Carter as executor aforesaid in
an action against said J. Robert Lang in said District
Court, and that garnishee judgment resultant upon said
action is absolutely void.
The conclusion is irrefutable that not only the indebtedness due from Carter as California executor to
J. Robert Lang but also funds in the custody of such
California executor intended for the payment of such
indebtedness were in the custody of the California Superior Court of Orange County, State of California. The conclusion of the matter may thus succinctly be stated:
"While property or money is in custodia legis,
the officer holding it is the mere hand of the
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court; his possession is the possession of the
court, and to interfere therewith is to invade the
jurisdiction of the court itself, an officer so situated being bound solely by the orders and judgments of the court whose mere agent he is, and
having no right to make any disposition of such
money or property without the consent of his own
court, express or implied. Hence, in the absence
of express statutory authority therefor, the general rule is that property or funds in custodia legis
are not subject to either attachment or garnishment." (6 Am. J u r . (2d), Sec. 196, p. 702).
CONCLUSION
Carter was and is an officer of the Superior Court
of Orange County, California, being appointed by that
court Executor of the Estate and under the last will and
testament of John Lang, deceased. The plaintiff-appellant proceeded against Carter in his representative capacity as Executor of the Estate of John Lang, deceased.
The garnishee judgment obtained by the plaintiff-appellant was against Carter in his representative capacity.
Carter as a California executor could not and cannot
be sued or proceeded against in a Utah court. Neither
can Carter in his representative capacity sue in a Utah
court. Carter, as a California executor, by his garnishment answer conferred jurisdiction on the Utah court
over his person, but he could not and did not confer
jurisdiction over the res. The res was funds of the California estate in the possession of the executor. The
garnishee judgment against Carter as Executor of the
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Lang Estate was therefore void, and the District Court
had no alternative except to nullify the same. It is
respectfully submitted that the order appealed from
should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
FRANKLIN RITER
F R E D L. FINLINSON
Attorneys for
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